This study aims to present a comparative analysis of philosophical theories of universals espoused by the foremost representatives of the three main schools of early modern scholastic thought. The book introduces the doctrines of Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548-1617), the Thomist John of St. Thomas, O.P. (1589-1644), and the Scotists Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola, O.F.M. Conv. (1602-1673) and Bonaventura Belluto, O.F.M. Conv. (1600-1676). The author examines in detail their mutual doctrinal delineation as well as the conceptualist tenet of the Jesuit Pedro (...) Hurtado de Mendoza (1578-1641), whose thought constitutes an important systematic point of comparison especially with Suárez's doctrine. The book offers the first comparative elaboration of the issue of universals, in both its metaphysical and its epistemological aspects, in the era of second scholasticism. (shrink)

The debate on universals is, generally speaking, a well-known subject in the history of philosophy, but views on universals from the end of the sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century—the object of Heider’s welcome contribution—are quite neglected. Such views are extremely sophisticated, drawing on the established traditions of Thomism and Scotism, in particular, but bringing them to a new level of technicality. Heider investigates three major positions: those of Francisco Suárez, João Poinsot, and the joint position of Bartolomeo Mastri and Bonaventura (...) Belluto. The three views are chosen to.. (shrink)

Answering in negative a question of M. Hrušák, we construct a Borel ideal not extendable to any \(F_\sigma \) ideal and such that it is not Katětov above the ideal \(\mathrm {conv}\).

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) (151 E-152C); as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils (152C-160D). Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) ; as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils. Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken.In that part of the dialogue where the question is under examination whether or not knowledge and perception are the same, Socrates uses an idealized concept of knowledge. That is, he restricts the use of the word by setting down what he will consider to be the essential characteristics of knowledge, the sufficient and necessary conditions of its being instantiated. An excellent piece of philosophical procedure. (shrink)

Este volumen colectivo se suma al 150 aniversario del fallecimiento de Arthur Schopenhauer, cuyo pensamiento tiene una enorme vigencia siglo y medio después, acaso entre otras muchas cosas por haber querido tender puentes entre categorías occidentales y orientales −una suerte de Buda de Occidente−, al no desdeñar ninguna tradición y oficiar como buen escanciador de autores clásicos e inmisericorde crítico del academicismo carpetovetónico. Este autor figura de manera inequívoca entre los grandes pensadores del ayer con proyección para el mañana. Fue (...) a la par un tábano punzante contra la vulgaridad pública y un promotor de la paideia de la excelencia. El Encuentro internacional celebrado en el Instituto de Filosofía del CSIC propició que se publiquen aquí las contribuciones aportadas por especialistas alemanes, italianos y españoles. La Colección de Clásicos europeos (que dirige Roberto R. Aramayo) pretende rescatar del olvido algunos textos fundamentales para comprender mejor nuestro presente, al poner en valor la impronta que han legado a Europa y al mundo determinados pensadores europeos. Como complemento a esa colección de textos, este volumen sobre Schopenhauer inaugura la serie de Diálogos con Clásicos europeos, que quisiera cumplir en castellano un papel similar al jugado por los Companions filosóficos de Cambridge. Conviene seguir dialogando con ciertos autores que forman parte del entramado de nuestro acervo cultural, pues no en vano el diálogo es condición sine qua non del filosofar. (shrink)

Answering in negative a question of M. Hrušák, we construct a Borel ideal not extendable to any Fσ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$F_\sigma $$\end{document} ideal and such that it is not Katětov above the ideal conv\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathrm {conv}$$\end{document}.

Because anticipated and retrospective regret play important roles in practical deliberation and motivation, better understanding them can illuminate the contours of human agency. However, the possibility of self-ignorance and the fact that we change over time can make regret—especially anticipatory regret—not only a poor predictor of where the agent will be in the future but also an unreliable indicator of where the agent stands. Granting these, this paper examines the way in which prospective and, particularly, retrospective regret can nevertheless yield (...) important insight into the sorts of creatures we are, both generally and individually. The experience of retrospective regret can show a person she values something in a way she did not know or that she is (or was) a different person than she had thought, insights which can factor into forward-looking, or prospective, deliberation. Such instances of revelatory regret reveal something to the agent about herself as agent. I examine two cases of agential self-ignorance. In the first, the experience of regret reveals what the agent values, not only to others but even to the agent himself. In the second, the agent anticipates experiencing regret for an action but does not experience the regret, suggesting that the agent did not value the rejected alternative in the way she thought. Anticipatory regret is forward-looking and can play an important role in practical deliberation. But insofar as anticipatory regret flows from one’s imperfect judgment and prospection about oneself, retrospective regret can be an important corrective in helping the agent understand her own standpoint. (shrink)

It is not quite as easy to see that there is in fact no formula of this modal language having the same truth conditions (in terms of S5 Kripke semantics) as (1). This was rst conjectured by Allen Hazen2 and later proved by Harold Hodes3. We present a simple direct proof of this result and discuss some consequences for the logical analysis of ordinary modal discourse.

Schiller kam im Jahre 1789 als Professor nach Jena und erregte mit seiner Antrittsvorlesung an der Universität Aufsehen. Darin stellt er den »Brotgelehrten«, der nur einen bequemen und gutbesoldeten Posten beansprucht, dem »philosophischen Kopf« gegenüber, der keine Mühe um der Wahrheit willen scheut. Brotgelehrte waren Erhard und Maimon mit Sicherheit nicht. Der eine war Jakobiner und Arzt, der andere jüdischer Autodidakt und unermüdlicher Wahrheitspilger. Gerade Fichte war derjenige, der aus den beiden Außenseitern Mitstreiter gemacht und ihnen den Rang philosophischer Köpfe (...) zuerkannt hat. Er hat sie neben dem ›grossen Mann‹, Kant, zu den einzigen Vorreitern seiner Rechtslehre erklärt. (shrink)